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Research Case

Group Cascades in Strategic Voting

Sequential group decision-making, information aggregation, and rule design

Research Question

How do voting rules shape information aggregation, cascade risk, and long-run welfare in sequential group decisions?

Core Contributions
  1. 1Bridges the literature on information cascades and strategic voting.
  2. 2Shows that flexible rules are outcome-equivalent to individual cascade games, while fixed rules are not.
  3. 3Compares optimal myopic and optimal limit rules under both private and public voting settings.
What I Built
A sequential Bayesian belief-updating framework.Rule-dependent equilibrium logic for strategic group voting.Cascade-threshold analysis for different voting-rule environments.Computational exploration of welfare under alternative institutional designs.
Sample Code

A simplified preview of the type of computational logic used to formalize belief updates and cascade conditions.

PosteriorUpdate[p_, h_] := (p * PrHGivenR[h]) /
  (p * PrHGivenR[h] + (1 - p) * PrHGivenL[h])

CascadeQ[p_, rL_, rR_] := p <= rL || p >= rR
Transferable Skills
Structured problem solvingComputational modelingResearch-to-code translationInstitutional and policy design thinking